I. INTRODUCTION
Almost 15 years ago R. Duncan Luce mentioned in a conversation that the Kolmogorovian probability theory (KPT) was unsatisfactory because it treated stochastic independence as a "numerical accident" rather than a fundamental relation. If I roll a die today in Irvine, California, Duncan said, and on another day you roll a die in Lafayette, Indiana, the fact that the two outcomes are independent cannot be established by checking the multiplication rule. On the contrary, the applicability of the multiplication rule in this case is justified by determining that the two dice are stochastically independent, "have nothing to do with each other."
This simple example (some may think too simple to be of great interest) leads us to the very foundations of probability theory. Let us try to understand it clearly by comparing it to another example. It is about a situation when I repeatedly roll a single die, having defined two random variables:
1 if the outcome is even 0 otherwise , B = 1 if the outcome exceeds 3 0 otherwise .
These two random variables co-occur in the most obvious empirical meaning: the values of A and B are always observed together, at every roll of the die. Another way of looking at it, the two random variables co-occur because they are functions of one and the same "background" random variable Z, the outcome of rolling the die. As a result, I can estimate from the observations the probabilities * E-mail: ehtibar@purdue.edu Pr as a symbol for probability throughout this paper): if the joint probability turns out to be the product of the two marginal ones (statistical issues aside), the two events are determined to be independent. I cannot simply make this determination a priori, as it depends on what die I am rolling: if it is a fair die, A and B are not independent, but if the distribution of the outcomes is value : 1 2 3 4 5 6 pr.mass : 0 The difference between this example and that of Duncan Luce's is not in the number of the dice being rolled: my example would not change too much if I roll two dice together, having marked them "Left" and "Right," and define the random variables as A = 1 if the Left outcome is even 0 otherwise , B = 1 if the Right outcome exceeds 3 0 otherwise .
The realizations of A and B again come together, this time the empirical meaning of the "togetherness" being "in the same trial," or "simultaneously." Again, one can also say that the two random variables co-occur because they are functions of one and the same "background" random variable Z, only this time it is the pair of values rather than a single one. And again, I can estimate from the observations the probabilities Pr [A = 1 and B = 1], Pr [A = 1], and Pr [B = 1] and check their adherence to the multiplication rule. Whether the two random variables are stochastically independent is determined by the outcome of this test: the dice may very well be rigged not to be independent. In Duncan Luce's example the situation is very different: the outcomes of rolling the two dice in two different places at two different times have no empirically defined pairing. and Pr [B = 1] and find out, e.g., that they are (statistical issues aside) 0.7 and 0.5, respectively. But I cannot estimate empirically Pr [A = 1 and B = 1]: the two random variables are not recorded in pairs. The experiment involves no empirical procedure by which one could find which value of B should be paired with which value of A. The two random variables therefore do not have an observable (estimable from frequencies) joint distribution, they cannot be presented as functions of one and the same "background" random variable. What one can do, however, is to declare the two random variables stochastically independent, based on one's understanding that they "have nothing to do with each other." If one does so, the validity of Pr [A = 1 and B = 1] being equal to the product of two individual probabilities is true by construction, requiring no empirical testing and allowing for no empirical falsification. This was Duncan Luce's point: while the KPT defines stochastic independence through the multiplication rule, at least in some cases the determination of independence precedes and justifies the applicability of the multiplication rule. In Duncan Luce's opinion, this warranted treating stochastic independence as a fundamental, "qualitative" relation preceding assignment of numerical probabilities. This opinion is in accordance with the general precepts of the representational theory of measurement. Thus, the authors of the first volume of Foundations of Measurement (Krantz et al., 1971 ) sympathetically refer to Zoltan Domotor 1969 dissertation in which he axiomatized probability theory treating stochastic independence as a primitive relation. As far as I know, however, it has not translated into a viable alternative to the KPT.
I accept Duncan Luce's example as posing a genuine foundational problem, but I disagree that this problem is about defining independence by means other than the multiplication rule. The position I advocate below in this paper is as follows.
1. Random variables that "have nothing to do with each other" are defined on different domains (sample spaces). Rather than being independent (which is a form of a joint distribution), they are stochastically unrelated, i.e., they possess no joint distribution.
2. It is not that we do not know the "true" distribution, or that in "truth" they are independent but we do not know how to justify this. A joint distribution simply is not defined (until imposed by us in one of multiple ways, discussed below).
3. The KPT is consistent with the idea of multiple sample spaces and in fact requires it for internal consistency: the idea of a single sample space for all random variables imaginable is mathematically untenable.
4. Any given set of pairwise stochastically unrelated random variables can always be coupled, i.e., imposed a joint distribution on. This is equivalent to inventing a pairing scheme for their realizations, and this can be done in multiple ways, coupling them as independent random variables being just one of them.
II. ON RANDOM VARIABLES, UNRELATEDNESS, AND INDEPENDENCE

II.1. Informal introduction
Stochastic unrelatedness is easy to distinguish from stochastic independence: the latter assumes the existence of a joint distribution, which means that an empirical procedure exists by which each realization of one random variables can be paired (coupled) with that of another. The most familiar forms of empirical coupling are co-occurrence in the same trial and co-relation to the same person. In the table below, c : 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
the indexing entity c can be the number of a trial (as in repeatedly rolling two marked dice together) or an ID of a person (as in relating heights and weights, or weights before and after dieting). The random variables X and Y here have a joint distribution: one can, e.g., estimate the probability with which X falls within an event E X and ("simultaneously") Y falls within an event E Y ; and if
for any two such events E X , E Y , then X and Y are considered independent. Suppose, however, that the information about c in (1) does not exist, and all one has is some set of values for X and some set of values for Y . Clearly, now the "togetherness" of X ∈ E X and Y ∈ E Y is undefined. Although Pr [X ∈ E X ] and Pr [X ∈ E X ] have the same meaning as before,
is undefined, and (2) cannot be tested. This is what stochastic unrelatedness is: lack of a joint distribution. A pair of stochastically unrelated random variables are neither independent nor interdependent, these terms do not apply.
Think, e.g., of a list of weights in some group of people before dieting (X) and a list of weights in some other group of people after dieting (Y ): which value of X should be paired with which value of Y to try to estimate
Any pairing one can impose here will be as good as any other pairing, and none of them is determined by the empirical procedures involved (weighing people in the two groups). This simple example has counterparts in all experiments where random variables are recorded under two or more mutually exclusive conditions. A question arises: couldn't one nevertheless treat stochastically unrelated X and Y as if they were independent? The answer is affirmative, but so is the answer to the question whether X and Y can be treated as if they were not independent. Treating the outcomes of rolling dice in Irvine on Tuesday (X) and in Lafayette on Friday (Y ) as if they were jointly distributed means constructing another pair of random variables, X, Y , this time a jointly distributed one, such that X and Y taken separately are distributed as X and Y , respectively. Such constructions form the subject of a special branch of probability theory called the theory of coupling(s) (Thorisson, 2000) .
Let, e.g., both dice be fair. One can always construct X, Y by assigning probability mass 1 36 to each of the 36 pairs. This pair X, Y is the independent coupling of X and Y . Its choice corresponds to pairing every realization of X with every realization of Y (or with uniformly randomly chosen realization of Y ). There is, however, no reason to single out the independent coupling. One can also make X and Y perfectly correlated or perfectly anticorrelated by assigning the probability masses as, respectively,
, where x, y ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. These couplings correspond to pairing each realization of X with only one specific realization of Y . If the dice producing X and Y have outcomes with different distributions, a perfectly correlated or anticorrelated coupling will not be possible, while the independent coupling will, as it is universally applicable. But the independent coupling still will not be the only possible one (unless one of the dice is rigged to roll a single outcome, in which case the only possible coupling can be viewed as independent, perfectly correlated, or perfectly anticorrelated).
One may be tempted to think that the "true" pairing should involve ordering the observations of X and Y chronologically and pairing the outcomes with the same trial number. A brief reflection should show, however, that this is an arbitrary choice: what theoretical principles would compel one to pair the first realization of X with the first realization of Y (occurring, in Duncan Luce's example, at another time in another place), rather than with the tenth one, the last one, or one having the same quantile rank? Recall also that the chronological sequences need not be defined to begin with: instead of rolling a single die repeatedly one could roll a large number of identical dice and count the events.
Summarizing, a joint distribution for empirically observed X and Y exists only if there is an empirical procedure for coupling their realizations, such as relating them to one and the same value of c in (1). Otherwise X and Y are stochastically unrelated. When they are, one can impose on them a joint distribution by creating a coupling X, Y for X and Y "on paper." The individual distributions of stochastically unrelated X and Y do impose some constraints on possible joint distributions of X, Y , but, except in degenerate cases, do not determine it uniquely. The independent coupling is not the only possible coupling of stochastically unrelated random variables.
II.2. Formalizing the "naive" account of random variables
Random variables are defined by their distributions (say probability masses associated with every possible roll of a die) and, in order to distinguish different variables having the same distribution, by their unique names (e.g., "the outcome of the die rolled in Irvine on Tuesday"). On a more general level, the distribution of a random variable called X is a probability space (S X , Σ X , µ X ), with the standard meaning of the terms: S X is the set of possible values for X, Σ X is a sigma-algebra of subsets of S X , and µ a probability measure.
1 For each element E X of Σ X (an event) we define the probability of X "falling in E X " or "satisfying E X " as
Given another random variable, called Y and distributed
, we say it is jointly distributed with X if there is a random variable Z = (X, Y ) whose name is "ordered pair of X and Y " and whose distribution is
for any events E X ∈ Σ X and E Y ∈ Σ Y . The meaning of Σ X ⊗ Σ Y is the smallest sigma-algebra on S X × S Y that contains pairwise products of events in Σ X and Σ Y . If such a Z = (X, Y ) exists (is defined among the random variables one considers), then the joint distribution of X and Y is unique. The existence of this random variable, however, is not established by a mathematical derivation from the properties of X and Y , it is determined by the existence of an empirical procedure in which the realizations of X and Y are observed "together." If Z = (X, Y ) does not exist, one can always construct a coupling Z = X, Y whose distribution is (S X × S Y , Σ X ⊗ Σ Y , ν), subject to (4). The only difference (but a critical one) is that the name of this Z is not "ordered pair of X and Y " but "ordered pair of X [whose distribution is the same as that of X] and Y [whose distribution is the same as that of Y ]." Such a Z can be freely introduced and does not change the X and Y being coupled; in fact, X, Y is stochastically unrelated to X and to Y .
All of this can be easily generalized to an arbitrary set of random variables (see, e.g., Dzhafarov and Kujala, in press ).
II.3. Random variables and joint distributions in KPT
The formal account just given is not that of the traditional KPT. The latter begins with the notion of a sample space, (S, Σ, µ), 2 and defines a random variables X as a measurable mapping of this space into a measurable space (S X , Σ X ), i.e., a function X : S → S ′ such that
The mapping induces on the codomain space (S X , Σ X ) a probability measure µ X , by the rule
for any E X ∈ Σ X . The resulting triple (S X , Σ X , µ X ) is called the distribution of X. If another measurable mapping Y is defined on the same sample space, mapping it into a codomain space
for any E X ∈ Σ X and E Y ∈ Σ Y . Note that unlike in the "naive" approach above, the joint distribution of X and Y here is mathematically derived from their individual definitions as measurable functions on the same sample space.
Clearly, any two random variables defined on the same sample space are jointly distributed. This may create a temptation to assume the existence of a common sample space and a joint distribution (even if unknown to us) for any two random variables. In turn, this would mean the existence of a common sample space for all possible random variables, so that random variables in any set under consideration possess a joint distribution, and this distribution is unique. Kolmogorov's (1933 Kolmogorov's ( /1956 ) book may seem to reinforce this view, as it does not explicitly speak of multiple sample spaces. I disagree with this interpretation, even if not uncommon (see, e.g., the overview of interpretations in Khrennikov, 2009c ). Kolmogorov's monograph ties the notion of a sample space 4 to "a complex of conditions which allows of any number of repetitions" (Kolmogorov, 1933 (Kolmogorov, /1956 , §2 of Chapter 1): this can be interpreted as a position very close to if not the same as the one argued for below. Whatever the correct interpretation, however, the notion of a single sample space for all random variables is untenable as it contradicts the common mathematical practices in dealing with random variables. In Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014a) we presented the following two arguments demonstrating this.
First of all, for any choice of a universal sample space (S, Σ, µ) all random variables X defined on it will have the cardinality of their set of possible values, defined as S X = X (S), less than or equal to the cardinality of S. There is, however, no justification, empirical or mathematical, for limiting the cardinality of the set S X of all possible values for a random variable X.
5
Second, even if we confine our attention to very simple random variables with one and the same distribution, there is no justification, empirical or mathematical, for limiting this set in any way. One can always add a new random variable to any given set thereof. Thus, given any set N of unit-normally distributed random variables, one can introduce a unit-normally distributed Y N such that its correlation with any X ∈ N is zero. If there were a universal sample space (S, Σ, µ), then there would be a definite set N * of all possible unit-normally distributed random variables. But this would mean that our Y N * would have to belong to this set, which is impossible, as Y N * cannot have zero correlation with itself.
To further appreciate the untenability of a universal sample space, observe that the identity mapping from this space into itself is a random variable, R. The idea of a universal sample space therefore is equivalent to the existence of a random variable R of which all imaginable random variables are functions. This does not add a new formal argument against the idea, but it seems especially demonstrative: what this mysterious "super-variable" R could be?
II.4. A reinterpreted (or revised?) KPT
All these considerations lead us to a different picture of the KPT, in which there are different, stochastically unrelated random variables R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . , corresponding to different, mutually exclusive conditions under which they are observed;
6 and for each of these random variables one can define various functions of it,
so that any two random variables that are functions of one and the same member of the set R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . possess a joint distribution, while any functions of two different members of this set do not. To preserve Kolmogorov's definition of a random variable, the R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . can be thought of as identity functions on their separate sample spaces.
This picture is a step in the right direction, but it is still flawed if we think of R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . as some fixed set comprising all pairwise stochastically unrelated random variables. The reason for this is that if R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . were a fixed set, with the corresponding sample spaces (which, since they are identity functions, are simultaneously their distributions)
then one could form a single random variables R * of which R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . (hence also all other random variables imaginable) were functions. This "super-variable" R * would have the set and sigma-algebra that are products of, respectively, sets and sigma-algebras in (8), and it would have a probability measure ν from which µ R , µ R ′ , µ R ′′ , . . . are computed as marginals, e.g.,
for any E R ∈ Σ R . We have seen already that the idea of such a "super-variable" is untenable.
A logically consistent way out of this difficulty is to consider R, R ′ , R ′′ , . . . as a class with uncertain and/or flexible membership.
7 Indeed, it should be clear from the previous discussion that random variables can be freely introduced, so, e.g., there is no fixed set of random variables with any given distribution. Some random variables we observe have an empirically defined coupling scheme, and then they are jointly distributed. Other sets of random variables we observe are observed under different conditions each and do not have an empirical coupling. Then they can be modeled as stochastically unrelated random variables. However, we then can create "copies" of these random variables and couple them "on paper" in a multitude of ways. This seems to be a consistent view of random variables. KPT is by no means dismissed in this view, because any distribution (S X , Σ X , µ X ) for a random variable X is a probability space subject to Kolmogorov's axioms:
Moreover, insofar as one focuses on a given set of jointly distributed random variables, all of them can be presented as measurable functions on a single sample space (or functions of a single random variable).
II.5. Radical contextualism
Is there a unique way of determining which random variables are and which are not stochastically interrelated? A general answer to this question is negative: the definition of a jointly distributed set of random variables involves an empirical procedure of coupling their realizations, "observing them together." The meaning of such an empirical procedure may be different for different situation and different observers. From the mathematical point of view, however, the question is about a language that makes the fundamental distinctions between stochastically related and stochastically unrelated random variables. Such a language is proposed in Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014b) , Dzhafarov, Kujala, and Larsson (2015) , , and Kujala, Dzhafarov, and Larsson (2015) . For an overview, see Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015a) and Dzhafarov, Kujala, and Cervantes (2016) .
It is postulated that every random variable's identity is determined by two types of variables, referred to as objects (also properties, entities, contents, etc.) and contexts (also conditions, environment, etc.). Intuitively, the random variables are treated as "measurements," the objects answer the question "what is measured?" whereas the contexts answer the question "how is it measured?" Let Q be a set of objects and C a set of contexts considered in a given study. The mentioning of "a given study" is essential: in a different study one could choose a different set of objects to measure and a different set of contexts in which to measure them. The measurement R of an object q ∈ Q in a context c ∈ C is denoted by R c q . The meaning of a context is that it provides an empirical coupling for the measurements within this context: the random variables R c q with different q measured within the same context c are "measured together," i.e., they possess a joint distribution. Denoting by Q c the subset of objects in Q that are measured in context c,
is a random variable (which implies that it has a distribution, and this distribution is a joint distribution of its components). On the other hand, any two random variables R The idea of such contextual notation and (mutatis mutandis) understanding of stochastic unrelatedness have precursors and analogues in the quantum-physical literature: see Khrennikov (2005 Khrennikov ( , 2008 Khrennikov ( , 2009a , Simon, Brukner, and Zeilinger (2001) , Larsson (2002) , Svozil (2012) , and Winter (2014). Khrennikov (2009c) points out that the contextual understanding of random variables is intrinsic features of von Mises's "ensemble approach" to probabilities: the identity of an "ensemble" of observations corresponds to context in which these observations are made.
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Three aspects of our theory, however, set it aside from this literature:
1. Contextual labeling is universal, and no two random variables recorded in different contexts have a joint distribution.
2. Pairwise stochastically unrelated random variables {R c } c∈C (each of which is a set of jointly distributed random variables) can be coupled at will, with no coupling being privileged.
The random variables {R
c } c∈C can be characterized by whether it is possible or impossible to couple them in a particular way (e.g., by a maximally connected coupling, as discussed in Section II.7).
Below I will give an example of how these principles work in solving the problem of selective influences in psychology, as well as its generalized version, the problem of contextuality, primarily studied in quantum mechanics. First, however, I have to address some obvious objections to the radical contextualism.
II.6. Possible objections
The first objection is that it is impossible to take into account all conditions in the world, and without knowing them one would not know if one deals with stochastically related or unrelated random variables. The response to this objection lies in the qualification "in a given study" I made when I introduced object sets Q and context sets C. The identification of random variables by what they measure and by how they measure it depends on what other variables in the world one records and relates to realizations of the random variables in question.
To give an example, let there be a very large group of husband-and-wife couples; to each of the husbands Alice poses one of two different Yes/No questions, a 1 or a 2 ; to each of the wives Bob poses one of two different Yes/No questions, b 1 or b 2 (that may be the same as or different from a 1 , a 2 ). Alice decides (this is not a matter of truth or falsity but one of convention) to consider the responses to a 1 and a 2 in the group of husbands as realizations of random variables R a1 and R a2 , respectively; and Bob defines R b1 and R b2 for the group of wives analogously. This labeling indicates that Alice treats a 1 and a 2 as objects being measured (by responses to these questions), and so does Bob for b 1 and b 2 .
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Let us ask now: what are the contexts in which Alice records her R a1 and R a2 ? By the rules of the survey each person answers a single question, so asking a 1 excludes asking a 2 and vice versa. In other words, the conditions under which one records answers to a 1 and a 2 are incompatible. Formally, this means that a 1 is measured in the context a 1 while a 2 is measured in the context a 2 : Alice has therefore stochastically unrelated random variables R By the same argument, either of Alice's measurements is stochastically unrelated to either of Bob's: the four measurements
(10) are made in four different contexts. It is clear, however, that Alice and Bob could try to form joint distributions of their measurements using some empirical coupling procedure, e.g., the pairing of the measurements by the marital relation: that is, pairing a husband's response to a i with his wife's response to b j , for each of the four combinations of i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. To do this means to form new contexts, (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 1 , b 2 ), (a 2 , b 1 ), and (a 2 , b 2 ), and to re-label Alice's random variables as
while Bob's random variables become
The previous four pairwise stochastically unrelated variables (10) are replaced now with the four pairwise stochastically unrelated variables
There is no justification for saying that either of these representations, (10) or (13), is more "correct" than another: Alice who does not know whose husband her respondent is and Alice who knows this deal with different sets of random variables. Another, related objection is that radical contextualism should lead to considering every realization of a random variable as being stochastically unrelated to every other realization. In the previous example, if Alice records the identities of the people she is posing the question a 1 to, then in place of a single R a1 a1 she creates random variables R John a1
, R
P eter a1
, etc., each with a single realization. In a typical behavioral experiment, John, Peter, etc. can be replaced with "trial 1," "trial 2," etc. As the contexts (upper indexes) differ, the variables are stochastically unrelated. Isn't this a problem? In particular, does not stochastic unrelatedness of the realizations of a random variable clash with the standard statistical practice of viewing them as independent identically distributed variables?
The answer to these questions is essentially the same as to the previous objection. Alice does not have to record the identity of the people she queries, and if she does not, then R a1 a1 is the random variable she forms. If she does the recording, then she creates new contexts, and it is indeed true then that R John a1
, etc, are pairwise stochastically unrelated. They can, however, be coupled, and as always when coupling is not based on an empirical procedure, this can be done in a multitude of ways. One possible coupling is the independent coupling, the other is the identity coupling, and one could create an infinity of other couplings.
This may be difficult to understand. Suppose we know that John responded Yes, Peter responded No, Paul responded No, etc. -then how could one speak of the identity coupling? Or, if we know that the response in trial n + 1 repeats the response in trial n with probability 0.7 -how can one speak then of the independent coupling? To answer these questions one should recall that by coupling pairwise stochastically unrelated R
(1) , R (2) , R (3) , . . . one does not mysteriously transform them into jointly distributed random variable. Instead one creates a new sequence R
(1) , R (2) , R (3) , . . . , in which each R (i) has the same distribution as R (i) , and all these components have a joint distribution. The table below demonstrates the logical structure of the identity coupling:
The boxed values are the ones factually observed, the rest of the values in each column are those attained by the corresponding components of the identity coupling. As we see, this has nothing to do with the observed values being or not being equal to each other. The next table demonstrates the logical structure of the independent coupling:
. . .
The boxed values, again, are those factually observed, and the primed values in the ith column are sampled from a coupling R (1) , R (2) , R (3) , . . . with stochastically independent components and R (i) = r i . Again, this has nothing to do with the observed values forming or not forming a sequence with certain statistical properties.
Focusing on the statistical properties of the observed ("boxed") values means, formally, that the observations in different trials (or responses from different persons) are treated as objects rather than contexts, all these objects being measured in a single context and therefore jointly distributed:
A third objection one can raise against the radically contextual reinterpretation (or revision) of the KPT is that the notions of an "object" and a "context" are not mathematically defined: they are primitives of the language proposed. How can one know what objects and what contexts to invoke in a specific situation? The response to this is that it is indeed not a mathematical issue. Mathematical analysis begins once one has specified a set Q of objects and a set C of contexts, and there is no single correct way of doing it.
Consider, e.g., the situation when two questions are asked in one of two orders, a → b or b → a. One can take a to be the same object measured in two different contexts, and similarly for b, forming thereby four random variables (responses to the questions)
By our rules, they are grouped into two stochastically unrelated random variables
This view of the situation leads to an interesting contextual analysis (Dzhafarov, Zhang, & Kujala, 2015) . It is, however, possible to deny that "the same question a" means "the same object a" in the two contexts: one can maintain instead that a asked first is simply a different object from a asked second; and similarly for b. In this view we have four objects, a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 (where index indicates whether the question is asked first or second), measured in two contexts, a 1 → b 2 and b 1 → a 2 . One ends up with two stochastically unrelated random variables
, R a1→b2 b2
and
This representation allows for no nontrivial contextual analysis (see below), as the stochastically unrelated random variables have no objects in common. It is, nevertheless, as legitimate a representation as the previous one. A psychologist will most probably choose (18) over (19) (Wang & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2014) , but it is not mathematics that dictates this choice.
II.7. An example of contextual analysis
The problem of selective influences was introduced to psychology by Sternberg (1969) and developed through a series of publications Townsend, 1984 Townsend, , 1990 Roberts & Sternberg, 1993; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995; Schweickert, Giorgini, & Dzhafarov, 2000; Dzhafarov 2003; Dzhafarov, Schweickert, & Sung, 2005; Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2008; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2010) . Later, a link has been established between this problem and the quantummechanical analysis of entanglement (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2012a -b, 2013 , 2014c and, more generally, probabilistic contextuality (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a -b, 2015a .
I will formulate the problem using the contextual language introduced above. Let there be a system acted upon by two inputs, α and β, and reacting by two simultaneous distinct responses, R α and R β (or distinct aspects of the same response, such as response time and response accuracy). The indexation here reflects the belief (or hypothesis) that R α is "primarily" influenced by α and R β by β. One can also say that R α measures α and R β measures β. The question is whether R α is also influenced by β and/or R β is also influenced by α. Let us simplify the problem by assuming that α ∈ {1, 2} and β ∈ {1, 2}, and they vary in a completely crossed factorial design, {1, 2} × {1, 2}. Each of the treatments (α, β) = (i, j) should be considered a context, wherefrom the responses of the system must be labeled
To remind the interpretation, R (α=i,β=j) α=i measures the object α = i in the context (α = i, β = j); R (α=i,β=j) β=j measures the object β = j in the same context; being in the same context, these two measurements form a random variable R (α=i,β=j) (whose components possess a joint distribution); however, the four random variables R (α=i,β=j) are pairwise stochastically unrelated. To lighten the notation, let us put
According to the definition of selective influences given in Dzhafarov (2003) and elaborated in Dzhafarov and Kujala (2010) , one says that A (22) always attain one and the same value, even though the value of β changes; and analogously for the remaining three equalities. Note that, by the definition of a coupling,
where d = means "has the same distribution as." If all A and B responses of the system have a finite number of possible values, this situation generalizes Bohm's version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradigm (Bohm & Aharonov, 1957; Bell, 1964) . Of course, the distributions of the A, B need not be generally in compliance with the quantum rules for entangled particles, but the existence or nonexistence of a coupling with the stipulated properties should be determinable for any observed A and B. Let us assume for simplicity that both A and B responses of the system are binary, and let us denote their values +1 and −1. In this special case the necessary and sufficient conditions for the selectiveness of influences are given by
where E stands for expected value. This (in an algebraically different form) was first proved by Fine (1982) , although (25) in his work is implied by the notation rather than stated explicitly. The distributional equalities (25) describe the condition known as marginal selectivity: the distribution of A ij i does not change with the value j of β, and the distribution of B ij j does not change with the value i of α. The numerical inequality (26) is known as the CHSH inequality (after the authors of Clauser et al., 1969) . In quantum mechanics, violations of this inequality when the marginal selectivity (25) holds is described by saying that the system is contextual (see, e.g., Kurzynski, Ramanathan, & Kaszlikowski, 2012) .
If the marginal selectivity (25) is violated, the CHSH inequality (26) cannot be derived, and it makes no difference whether it is satisfied or not. Moreover, if marginal selectivity is violated, it seems unnecessary to look at anything else: clearly then A is not selectively influenced by α alone, and/or B is not selectively influenced by β alone. As it turns out, however, one may still be interested in the question: is the influence of β upon A and/or of α upon B entirely described by the violations of marginal selectivity? Indeed, since the CHSH inequality (26) may very well be violated when the marginal selectivity (25) holds, and since we then conclude that selectiveness of influences is violated too, we have to admit that the "wrong" influences (from β to A and/or from α to B) can be indirect, without manifesting themselves in changed marginal distributions. This leads us to a generalized notion of contextuality Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2015a-b; Dzhafarov, Zhang, Kujala, 2015; Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Cervantes, 2016) .
When applied to our example with two binary inputs α, β and two binary random outputs A, B, the definition is as follows. A system is noncontextual if it has a maximally connected coupling. The latter is defined as a coupling (22) (22) has this and the analogously computed maximal values for other equalities in (23), then the system is noncontextual: the "wrong" influences in it are all confined to directly changing the distributions of the "wrong" random variables. If no such coupling exists, however, the system is contextual: the influence of β upon A and/or α upon B is greater than just distributional changes. As shown in Dzhafarov, Kujala, and Larsson (2015) , Kujala, Dzhafarov, and Larsson (2015) , and Kujala and Dzhafarov (in press), the necessary and sufficient condition for noncontextuality in accordance with this definition is
For application of this and other criteria of contextuality to available experimental data in physics and psychology see, respectively, Kujala, Dzhafarov, and Larsson (2015) and Dzhafarov, Zhang, and Kujala (2015) .
III. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this paper that the KPT (Kolmogorovian probability theory) must allow for stochastically unrelated random variables, and these must not be confused with stochastically independent ones. I have argued for radical contextualism: any two random variables recorded under different conditions (in different contexts) are stochastically unrelated. There is no fixed set of pairwise stochastically unrelated random variables: they can be freely introduced and freely coupled. To couple a given set of stochastically unrelated random variables means to create their jointly distributed "copies" (stochastically unrelated to the "originals"). The couplings for a given set of random variables are typically infinite in number, with no coupling being "more correct" than another. This applies also to couplings with stochastically independent components. The idea I and Janne Kujala have been promoting in recent publications is that stochastically unrelated random variables can be usefully characterized by their possible couplings, in particular, by determining whether these variables allow for couplings subject to certain constraints. I have illustrated this idea on the issue of selective influences, generalized into the issue of probabilistic contextuality.
